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THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS UNDER
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
JAMES

LAWSUITS
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K. DREW* *

INTRODUCTION
nVOLVING LABOR DISPUTES fied in the United States district

courts in 1961 totaled 2,484. In the same year, the number of civil
rights cases filed was only 296. Within the next decade, however, the
number of civil rights cases filed in the district courts had risen to 6,133
in 1972, a dramatic percentage increase of 1,972.1 The only area of civil
litigation in the federal courts registering a higher tally in 1972 was the
closely related area of prisoner petitions. From the briefest perusal of
these startling statistics, it becomes readily apparent that civil rights
litigation is not only "here to stay," but indeed occupies a substantial
percentage of the federal courts' civil trial calendar across the country.
As in the days when the parameters of the law of products' liability
were first being established, there is presently a great deal of parrying
between the plaintiff's bar and defense counsel to ascertain the exact
limits of liability in this rapidly growing field, as well as to determine
the direction of the law.
One of the most hotly contested areas of civil rights litigation is the
question of whether the doctrine of respondeat superiorhas application to
actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1983. This
doctrine is of early common law origin. 2 It includes the concept that a
master may be liable for the conduct of 'his servant even though such acts
were not previously authorized. Additionally, liability may be established
against the master even though he had no personal participation in the
illicit act. Liability is imposed merely because the servant committed
the tort while engaged in the scope of his employment.3
* J.D.; member of the Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin bars. Author of IN FEDERAL
CouRTS. Mr. Schirott is a partner in the firm of Judge, Hunter & Schirott, Ltd.,
Park Ridge, Illinois.
** J.D.; member of the Illinois Bar. Ms. Drew is an associate of the firm Judge,
Hunter & Schirott, Ltd., Park Ridge, Illinois.
1

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES CouRTs (1972).
2

See Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930); Darman
v. Zilch, 56 R.I. 413, 186 A. 21 (1936).
3RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957); W. SEAVEY, HANmBOOK OF THE
LAw OF AGENCY, § 83 (1964); 6 INDIANA L. REv. 509 (1973).
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The modern day justification for ,the existence of the doctrine of
respondeat superior is that public policy demands the allocation of the
risk to the employer, and that the employer, in turn, will make the risk part
of the cost of doing business. It is the employer who profits by the acts of
the employee, and it is the employer who is able to absorb the losses
caused by the wrongful acts of his employees. The employer is the individual who is able to distribute the losses, through prices, rates, or liability
insurance to the public. In addition, the doctrine is an incentive to the
employer to take care in the selection and supervision of his employees. 4
The very basis of the rule underlies the reason why it should have no
application to cases involving supervisory public officials. Such officials are
not in a superior position to absorb, distribute or shift the losses because,
very simply, public employers are not engaged in the type of endeavor
which would support such type of activity. In Jennings v. Davis,5 the
Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals commented on
this very point:
With such justification in mind the "master" of course, is and can
only be the municipality employing the appellees. It is the city who
set the enterprise in motion, who "profits" from the appellees' labor
and who, if held liable in such instances, can by its powers of taxation
spread the resulting expenditures amongst the community at large.
Thus, if there is a "master" in the domain of public employment, it
is the city, county, state or subdivisions thereof. Ordinarily, the question
would end with such a logical analysis, and the plaintiff would sue the
municipal employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior 'as it is
the "master." However, the courts have almost unanimously held that a
municipal corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of the Act so
as to 'allow the maintenance of a Civil Rights action against such a
6
municipal corporation.
Consequently, plaintiffs' attorneys continue to initiate actions against
supervisory public officials inasmuch as vicarious liability cannot be
sought against the corporate body which employs the supervisory official
and his culpable subordinate.
APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

UNDER SECTION 1983
The vast majority of the courts which have considered the question,
have held that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application to
actions brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act against
ed. 1971).
5476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973).
6 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973); Evain v. Conlisk,
364 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ml1.1973).
4W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 458, 459 (4th
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supervisory officials. 7 On the theory that personal involvement is
contemplated under the Civil Rights Act, the federal district courts have
held that absent direct personal participation, there can be no liability.
Thus, police supervisory personnel have not been held liable for damages
caused by their subordinates in a number of federal district court decisions.
On this basis, a trial court, when confronted with the question, should
sustain a motion to dismiss where plaintiff sues supervisory public officials
8
under the Civil Rights Act, on a theory of vicarious liability.
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority which holds that the
doctrine of respondeat superior has no application to actions maintained
under the Civil Rights Act, virtually every case alleging police brutality
or false arrest includes one count embracing the theory of vicarious
liability joining a supervisory police official as a defendant. For the
most part, the general rule of non-applicability of the doctrine of
respondeatsuperiorcan be raised with a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the occasion may arise, where due to the posture of
plaintiff's complaint, it may be expeditious to move for a dismissal
of supervisory officials, not with a motion to dismiss, but rather with a
motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(b). In furtherance of this end, the court will accept
affidavits which show that no material question of fact exists as to the
extent of participation of the said official and that such non-participation
entitles the movant to a judgment as a matter of law. An affidavit which
proved to be sufficient and which seemingly contains all the necessary
elements for the dismissal by summary judgment of a supervisory officer
9
can be found in Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk. In that case, the body of the
affidavit presented in support of defendant's motion for summary
judgment stated as follows:
TRichardson v. Snow, 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972); Bichrest v. School Dist of
Philadelphia, 346 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boreta v. Kirby, 328 F. Supp. 670
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Campbell v. Anderson, 335 F. Supp. 483 (D. Del. 1971); Bennett
v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Barrows v. Faulkner, 327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971);

Mack v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F. Supp.
277 (N.D. I1. 1969); Runnels v. Parker, 263 F. Supp. 271 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Salazar
v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966); 6 INDIANA L.R. 509 (1973).
8 Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp.
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Candelaria v. Valdez, 353 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Colo. 1973);
Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Landman v.
Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Ryan v. New Castle County, 365 F.
Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1973); Boyden v. Troken, 358 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Lathon v. Parish of Jefferson, 358 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1973); Harty v. Rockefeller,
338 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Battle v. Lawson, 352 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla.
1972); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Campbell v.
Anderson, 335 F. Supp. 483 (D. Del. 1971); Arroyo v. Walsh, 317 F. Supp. 869
(D. Conn. 1970); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966); Jordan
v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
9 60 F.R.D. 121, 123 (N.D. IL. 1973).
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I have never known the plaintiff... and I have no personal knowl-

edge of any of the occurrences which were alleged to have taken
place involving the plaintiff... and the other defendants, or other
persons who are employed by the... Department of Police, on
various dates referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and at all other
times relative to the plaintiff's complaint. (emphasis added).
By approving the contents of the affidavit, the court tacitly indicated
that before there can be liability on the part of a supervisory police
official, there must 'be direct participation-or at the very least direct
personal knowledge.

The United States Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray,'0 held that the
Civil Rights Act should be read against a backdrop of common law tort
liability. This mandate has been interpreted by the various courts to mean
that in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, the defendant may rely
upon any defense which was available to him in the equivalent common
law cause of action." Consequently, it could be argued that an action may
not be maintained against a supervisory government official under a theory
of respondeat superior unless such action could have been maintained at
common law on facts in pari materia.But as pointed out previously, under
the common law, the overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions which
have considered the question 'have 'held that the doctrine of respondeat
2
superior had no application to actions brought against public officials.'
In Barker v. C., P. & St. L. Ry. Co.,13 the court stated:

The principle is well recognized that public officers and agents of the
government are exempt, as such, from liability to answer for the acts
of their subordinates. They are liable for their own personal
negligence or defaults in the discharge of their duties but not for the
acts or defaults of inferior officials in the public service, whether
appointed by them or not. (Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507.)

Public officials should also 'be exempted from liability for the
negligence and wrongful acts of their subordinates on a public policy
basis. The common law has long -takeninto consideration the concept that
competent persons would be unwilling to accept the public position which
would impose upon them liability for wrongs committed by subordinates
whom -they did not appoint and could not discharge. It is, therefore, to the
1o 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
11Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d
367 (7th Cir. 1968); Laverne v. Coming, 354 F. Supp. 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Jenkins v. Meyers, 338 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. I1. 1972).
2
1 Marshall v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. App. 2d 812, 281 P.2d 544 (1955);

Tate v. National Security Corp., 58 Ga. App. 874, 200 S.E. 314 (1938); Kebert v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 134 Kan. 401, 5 P.2d 1085 (1931); Lunsford v. Johnson,

132 Tenn. 615, 179 S.W. 151 (1915); Stinnet v. Sherman, 43 S.W. 847 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1897).

'3243 IM.482,486 (1910).
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benefit of the public that responsibility for acts -be imposed only on
the perpetrator of those acts, and not upon his innocent superior. Thus, the
general common law rule is that the doctrine of respondeat superior does
not, in the absence of a statute, make a public official liable for the acts
of his subordinates; 14 and the doctrine has no application to actions
maintained under section 1983 because public officials are not "masters"
within the ambit and meaning of this common law doctrine. The only
"master" of a public official within the common law meaning of the
15
doctrine would be the corporate body employing him.
The respondeatsuperior issue in the relationship of a public employee
and his superior can also be approached from the "fellow-servant"
theory. 16 Using this reasoning, police chiefs and other high municipal
officials would not be "masters" within the respondeat superior doctrine,
but would only be fellow-servants of the lower public employees.
Moreover, liability could not rest with police chiefs or other high
municipal officials because they would be considered to be only servants
of the municipality, and not the masters of their subordinates.
ADDITIONAL THEORIES OF INVOLVEMENT
In an effort to show personal involvement by a public supervisory
official, and thereby keep the official a "named" defendant in a civil rights
action, and thus, give the case the sort of notoriety that plaintiffs' attorneys
may desire, more than one plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that the
defendant has constructive knowledge of the events which gave rise to
the action. Under this theory, the plaintiff is not proceeding under the
doctrine of respondeat superior at all. However, this tactic cannot be
countenanced, since it has been held that the defendant must have actual
knowledge of the actions of his subordinates, and must acquiesce to these
actions. 17 The plaintiff's complaint, to withstand a motion to dismiss based
on the non-applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior, must
contain allegations of direct involvement by the defendant. Absent such
18
allegations, the plaintiff's complaint must fall.
Nor will it rectify fatal defects in the plaintiff's complaint to allege
that the supervisory officials knew (or should have known) that the
psychological condition of the defendant police officer was of such
4
Puett v. City of Detroit, 323 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957
(1964); Middleton v. Pearman, 305 F. Supp. 1203 (D.S.C. 1969); Klikowski v.
Ziegler, 16 Ill. App. 2d 583, 149 N.E.2d 773 (1958); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 128 (1950);
Annot. 14 A.L.R.2d 345 (1950).
15E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICn'AL CORPORATIONs 208-211 (3d ed. 1949). See Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
16 6 INDIANA L. RLv. 509 (1973).
7
1 See cases cited note 8 supra.
18 Evain v. Conlisk. 364 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Boyd v. Adams, 364 F. Supp.
1973); Candelaria v. Valdez, 353 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Colo. 1973).
1180 (N.D. M11.
1
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a nature as to make him prone to the erratic behavior which gave rise
to a violation of a private citizen's constitutional rights. 19
NEGLIGENT HIRING AND TRAINING
The maintenance of an action against supervisory personnel because
of their negligence in failing to properly train subordinates was allowed
in Carterv. Carlson.20 However, Judge Abraham Lincoln Marovitz, when
confronted with this argument in Boyd v. Adams,21 responded by stating
that the doctrine of respondeat superior requires personal involvement
and that an allegation of injury not resulting from the direct action

of a named defendant will not -be permitted. This requirement of
personal involvement is recognized not only by the reported case law,
but also by the commentators.2
In Jordan v. Kelly,u the court held that a police chief would be
responsible for the wrongful acts of an officer only if he was present
at the time the acts were committed, or if it could be shown that he
directed such acts or personally cooperated in them.
Thus, the complaint must contain allegations of participation, and
a negligence theory will not be allowed.
The court in Jennings v. Davis, 4 'held that to extend the general duty
of these supervisory personnel to prudently select, educate and supervise
employees with regard to an isolated, spontaneous incident would be
beyond reason. Allegations of this type have been 'held to be defective
when they consist solely of the base assertion that the plaintiff's injuries
resulted 'from alleged gross failure to properly train, restrain and supervise
the activities of the offending policemen, since these allegations fail to
state the personal, specific and factual involvement in the complained of
attack necessary to impose liability325
A police chief may have as one of his duties the selection of members
of the force. He is not responsible, however, for their acts unless he has
directed such acts to be done, or 'has personally cooperated in the offense.
-

19 Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
20 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. 1971), rev'd, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
21364 F. Supp. 1180 (N.D. 1M. 1973).
22
Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Burnett v. Short,
311 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Mack v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ga.
1969); Patrum v. Martin, 292 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Ky. 1968); Runnels v. Parker, 263
F. Supp. 271 (C.D. Ca. 1967); Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Ark.
1963); C. J.ANTmAu,Fanaw.L Cvim Riorrs AcTs § 90 (1971); 57 GEo. W. 1270
(1969).
23223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
24 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
5Boyd v. Adams, 364 F. Supp. 1180 (N.D. 111.1972); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F. Supp.
277 (N.D. IlL1969).
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The "fellow-servant" doctrine would argue that a police chief, like each
individual police officer, is just another public servant.26
In most cases, it is the city, county or state government that is the
employer of each public servant. Supervisory personnel ordinarily lack
the power or control to hire and fire employees for the government. Thus,
they lack the discretion of a "master" within the doctrine of respondeat
superior. It is, in most jurisdictions, an administrative board which
discharges civil service employees, and then, only after a hearing. It can
thus -be argued that respondeat superior cannot be applied to the
supervisory personnel under such circumstances, although there is some
limited authority for acceptance of such a theory. 27 The greater weight of
authority states that liability under section 1983 may not be predicated
upon the theory that a public official was negligent in supervising the work
of his assistants. 28 By proceeding under such a theory, the plaintiff falls
prey to yet another pitfall; he pleads mere negligence, which does not give
rise to a cause of action under section 1983. When faced with such a
complaint, the defendant must merely state that no person 'has a federally
protected constitutional or statutory right to be free from injury to his
person resulting from simple negligence. 29 Negligence is commonly defined
as a breach of duty which one person owes to another and it may take the
form of a positive act or omission to act. The courts have recognized that
to give rise to a cause of action under section 1983, a certain result must
be intended and the act accomplishing that result must be a conscious
one, although there need be no conscious intent to deprive plaintiff of
his constitutional rights.30
Consequently, it is stated that mere negligence does not give rise to
a deprivation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment.31 One court
has very recently warned that it is in error to speak in terms of negligence
with respect to a section 1983 action where, for instance, the action is one
for assault, battery or.false imprisonment.32 It has further (been recognized
that negligence in failing to_.protect a prisoner. i5 not sufficient to. state
a cause of actionunder section 1983.33
2

SAshenhurst v. Carey, 351 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F.
Supp.
731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
2
7Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972);
Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183
(5th Cir. 1971); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); Nesmith v.
Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963); Lucas v. Kale, 364 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Va.
1973).
28Hamilton v. Jamieson, 355 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
2 Beishir v. Schanzmeyer, 315 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
SO
Jenkins v. Meyers, 338 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
3
2Kent v. Prasse, 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir.
1967).
3
2 Mullins v. City of River Rouge, 338 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
33
Wright v. Mill County, Civil No. 73-1614 (N.D. IlL., filed June 21, 1973).
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It is apparent then, that the plaintiff in circumventing the nonapplicability of the respondeatsuperior rule, "jumps from the frying pan
into the fire" when he seeks to impose liability on supervisory officials on
the theory that such officials were negligent in hiring and training their
employees. Simple negligence does not give rise to a violation of as4right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the fourteenth amendment, and
section 1983 protects only federal rights that are violated under color of
state law. Ordinary tortious conduct, without more, committed by a state
official acting under color of law, is insufficient to show a deprivation of
rights under the Civil Rights Act,35 since recovery under the Civil Rights
Act can be had only where the conduct involved amounted to either a
deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law, or cruel or unusual
punishment. 38 In this regard, allegations of negligent hiring or training
will probably fail to satisfy the constitutional requirements.
THE APPLICATION OF STATE VICARIOUS LIABILITY LAW
In Hesselgesser v. Reilly,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals gave

recognition to the laws of the various states in determining whether or
not vicarious liability should be applied in an action arising under the
Civil Rights Act. Under this rule, vicarious liability could be applied
in the type of circumstances where the state in which the action arose
imposed common law vicarious liability for the acts of various public
officials for common law torts.
Any such analysis is subject to potential flaws. The initial defect
is a potential misinterpretation of the statute supposedly imposing
vicarious liability. For instance, in Illinois, the statutory liability of the
sheriff is codified as follows: "The sheriff shall be liable for any neglect
or omission of the duties of his office, when occasioned by a deputy, in
38
the same manner as for his own personal neglect or omission."
point
to
quick
However, the Illinois court, in interpreting this statute, was
out that, despite the impression that a cursory reading of the statute may
imply the statute can be a vehicle for liability, such was not the statute's

39
intended purpose. In De Correvant v. Lohman, the court stated:
The plaintifi cannot utilize this section to further the allegations of
his complaint which charged, not neglect or omission, but intentional

Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 1967); Wood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 322
F. Supp. 436 (W.D. La. 1971); Hurley v. Field, 282 F. Supp. 34 (C.D. Ca. 1968);
Cullum v. Calif. Dept. of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ca. 1967).
35 United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d
Cir. 1970); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
36 See, e.g., Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
37 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
34

38 ILL. REv. STAT., Ch. 125, § 13 (1955).

3984 M1.App. 2d 221,227-28,228 N.E.2d 592, 595 (1967).
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misconduct by the deputies. Section 16 imposes liability for the
sheriff's disobedience to perform the command of any writ legally
issued to him. This section is inapplicable since the deputies were not
acting pursuant to a writ. Thus, there was no basis for recovery
from Lohman. (emphasis added).
There is recent authority to the effect that the determination of
whether a state statute affects liability under the Civil Rights Act may
be determined by the contemplation of the framers in drafting such
legislation. 40 Thus, it must ,be established that the framers of the statute
intended that certain public officials should be vicariously liable for the
common law torts of certain fellow employees. Applying this principle to
the Civil Rights Act, vicarious liability of high officials would seem
to subvert the very purpose of the various Civil Rights Statutes. The
United States District Court in Sandburg v. Daly41 followed this type of
analysis and found: "[T]hese statutes are aimed at those who subject others
to a deprivation of their constitutional rights, rather than at the state or
city which employs them or the official with ultimate authority over them
in the governmental hierarchy."
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act is seemingly frustrated if
liability can be imposed upon the innocent supervisor rather than the
perpetrator of an act merely as a consequence of a legislative enactment,
the framers of which, in all likelihood, never contemplated liability
in such circumstances.
In Candelariav. Valdez,42 the court stated that the Civil Rights Act
contemplates personal involvement, and personal involvement requires
that the person charged be present at the time of the wrongful act, or that
the person charged directed or cooperated in the violation. If the Court in
Candelaria was correct and personal involvement is contemplated by the
Civil Rights- Act, then it would seem that such prerequisite should be
controlling even. if local law might proyide -liability for. the sheriff for
the-acts of his deputies. 4
.
THE LIABILITY OF SPECIFIC PUBLIC OFFICIALS
While the overwhelming number of cases involving the doctrine of
respondeatsuperior have dealt with the question of whether a supervising
police officer or other municipal officer is liable for the actions of
subordinate policemen, the raising of the issue is not exclusive to
police officers. Other public officials, including county auditors, court
administrators, prison supervisors, and city mayors have been named as
defendants under a vicarious liability theory.
40

Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. 111. 1972).

41306 F. Supp. 277,278 (N.D. 111.
1969).
42353 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Colo. 1973).
4

3See Battle v. Lawson, 352 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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It should be noted, however, that the mere holding of a public office
cannot give rise to the assumption of actual knowledge of a conspiracy.
In Hampton v. City of Chicago," the court 'held that a complaint which
alleged that the city mayor, by virtue of his position, has knowledge of
the alleged conspiracy was insufficient to state a cause of action.
In Veres v. County of Monroe,4 the court stated that more than
mere authority by the defendant over others who violated the plaintiff's
rights must be shown. In Veres the court stated that at least one
specific act or omission by the county auditor, which was a factor in
depriving the plaintiff of his civil rights, must be alleged.
Likewise, it has been held that where there is no indication that
the administrator of the court was personally responsible for the
negligence of one of his employees, the court should properly dismiss
an action maintained against him.4
Where there is no evidence that a prison supervisor had any
knowledge as to the alleged defective condition of certain punch press
machines, liability may not be imposed upon him under the Civil Rights
Act, for the reason that the requisite culpability and -the requisite personal
47
involvement do not exist.
Just as a police supervisor incurs no liability for the acts of his
subordinates where 'he is not present, so too, can an arresting officer
claim freedom from liability for alleged civil rights violations after the
brought to the police station and is in the custody
arrested person has been
4
and control of others. 8
In many instances, the named defendant was not even employed by
the municipal body when the alleged occurrence took place. In most of
these cases, the defense of respondeat superior is available to any such
defendant. The question becomes more complex, however, where the
defendant is a county official, such as the county auditor. In such
instances, it is really the office which is often the true party in interest,
and the named defendant should look to -the complaint to ascertain
whether or not this is a suit brought against the individual county official
in his personal capacity, or whether it is brought against the office of that
county official. If the latter is true, there is authority for the proposition
49
that the mandate of Monroe v. Pape prevents such a suit, to wit:
Plaintiffs also attempt to distinguish Monroe on the ground that
the individual defendants in this case were dismissed only in their
44 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, No. 73-814 (1974).
4 364 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
46 Davis v. Quarter Sessions Court, 361 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
47 Matthews v. Brown, 362 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1973).
4
s Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
49365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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individual capacities, with the suit proceeding against the individual
defendants in their official capacities as well as against the district.
Courts that have had occasion to apply Monroe in this situation have
uniformly held that suits may be maintained only against the officials
individually, and that governmental boards and governmental officials
within the meaning of
in their official capacities are not persons
50
section 1983. This is only reasonable.
While the factual situation may change, the applicable rule seems to
be the same. For example, a state's attorney is not liable for the actions of
his assistant where it is shown that the state's attorney had no direct
participation in the activities of his assistant, and where there is such
showing, there can be no liability predicated upon the doctrine of
5
respondeat superior. 1
It is often stated that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no
application to actions seeking damages. 52 However, this seems to assume
that a municipality is not subject to suit for money damages, while
53
implying that it is subject to suit under this section for injunctive relief.
Perhaps any such distinction 'has been obviated by the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Bruno v. City of Kenosha,54 where the Supreme
Court held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 was never intended to have
a bifurcated meaning.
In Bruno, the court indicated that a municipality is not a "person"
under section 1983 for any purpose:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in
the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the generic
word "person" in section 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the
relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held in Monroe,
"Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within
the ambit of" section 1983 [365 U.S.], at 187, they are outside of its
ambit -for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages.s

5OHarkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 794, 807 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
51
Hampton v. Gilmore, 60 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Hamilton v. Jamieson, 355
F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
52 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, ...... U.S .......
5sC. ANTiAu, FEDERAL CIvI. RIGHTS AcTs § 90 (1971).
54412 U.S. 507 (1973).
55 Id. at 513.
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CONCLUSION
Where civil rights actions are brought against supervisory public
officials, such officials are not without a defense. A substantial portion of
those courts which have considered the question hold that vicarious liability
cannot be countenanced under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section
1983, because personal involvement is contemplated under that section.
Additionally, defenses available under the common law are also
available in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, because under
the prevailing rule respondeatsuperior could not be relied upon to found
liability under the common law and likewise cannot form the basis
of liability under the Civil Rights Act.
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